MEXICO-U.S. AVOCADO TRADE EXPANSION by Orden, David
56 Keeping the Borders Open
David Orden
MEXICO-U.S. AVOCADO TRADE EXPANSION
INTRODUCTION
Recent attention to agricultural trade policy has turned to issues of
technical barriers, particularly sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations,
that constrain movement of products across international borders.  It is
intuitive that there are public good arguments that make some SPS restric-
tions necessary to insure a safe food supply and protect domestic animal
herds and plant stocks from pests and diseases.  In other cases, regulations
rationalized on technical grounds seem to lack firm scientific foundations
and appear, at least to potential beneficiaries of expanded trade, to be im-
posed primarily to shield domestic producers from competition.  That such
controversies arise is not surprising.  Their likelihood is suggested by the
economic theory of regulation, sometimes referred to as “capture” theory.
Applied to technical trade barriers, the theory suggests that when there is
doubt about the merit of a technical restriction, domestic interest groups
will often succeed in obtaining  protective decisions from domestic regula-
tory agencies.
Both NAFTA and the WTO address issues of SPS and other techni-
cal trade barriers.  Under NAFTA, it was agreed that each country retains
the right to adopt SPS measures to protect human, animal, and plant life57
and health, that each country has the right to establish appropriate levels of
protection, and that SPS measures must be based on scientific evidence, be
non-discriminatory, and be applied only to the extent necessary.  The WTO
provides even stronger language about the use and misuse of technical
trade barriers.  In both cases, multilateral dispute settlement procedures are
established.  If an arbitration panel decides that an import regulation vio-
lates the NAFTA or WTO provisions, the non-compliant country has the
option of either changing the measure or keeping it and compensating the
challenging country for the value of impaired trade.
In light of the economic theory of regulation, the NAFTA and WTO
provisions that address technical trade barriers are institutional innova-
tions intended to moderate the influence of domestic interest groups on
their national regulatory agencies. One hope of these agreements is that
the enunciation of the principles for SPS regulations and the existence of
binding adjudicatory mechanisms will contribute to negotiated resolution
of some disagreements without recourse to the formal dispute settlement
process.
One approach to easing technical trade restrictions is to shift from
most restrictive instruments such as complete bans to less restrictive in-
struments of pest control. The key to such an alternative is often a “sys-
tems approach” to risk management, whereby a set of procedures are speci-
fied that in principle reduce the externality risk associated with trade of a
commodity. Adoption of systems approaches rest on a firm foundation in
Article 5.6 of the WTO SPS Agreement, which states that Members shall
ensure that their measures “are not more trade-restrictive than required to
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection”
(WTO, 1994).
Since 1997, a long and contentious dispute between Mexico and
the United States over U.S. restrictions on importation of Hass avocados
has been partially resolved by replacing an import ban with limited trade
under a system of risk mitigation measures. This case illustrates that progress
can be made through adoption of a systems approach -- at least when the
risk issues can be sharply delineated and addressed, and governments are
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firmly committed to the negotiations. Easing of the full import ban that has
occurred must be counted as progress, but it has opened access to less than
10 percent of the U.S. market to Mexican producers. It remains uncertain
how much more trade opening will eventually be achieved.
THE AVOCADO QUARANTINE
The ban on imports of Mexican avocados was promulgated in 1914
when there were no known controls (chemical or natural predators) for
certain host-specific avocado pests prevalent in Mexico but not present in
the United States.1  Subsequent development of modern pesticides and
cultural practices has allowed the Mexican state of Michoacan to establish
an industry of approved export-oriented avocado orchards. These orchards
have successfully met the pest control standards of countries such as Canada
and Japan, where there are concerns about transmission of fruit fly infesta-
tions. Mexican quarantine authorities have argued that the Michoacan avo-
cado export protocols also provide adequate protection against pest risks
of U.S. concern, i.e., that the region has low incidence of pests of quaran-
tine significance, that the Hass avocado is not a preferred host for some
pests of concern, and that a systems approach to handling fruit for export
has proven effective in eliminating risks of pest infestations being carried
abroad. Mexico contends that the U.S. ban cannot be justified on a risk
basis, but is maintained to protect the U.S. industry economically. The
U.S. avocado industry, concentrated in southern California, has bitterly
opposed opening the U.S. domestic market to Mexican avocados. The
industry acknowledges that it has received prices well above those of Mexi-
can exports, but asserts that it fears pest infestations associated with trade
not competition in the marketplace. Domestic U.S. producers have chal-
lenged Mexican assessments of pest risks and the effectiveness of the sys-
tems approach to risk management.
Caught in the middle of this controversy has been the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Twice during the 1970s USDA took preliminary steps
____________________
1  Roberts and Orden (1996) provide a detailed analytic chronology of the avocado
dispute.59
to ease the avocado import ban, but in both cases the decision was aborted.
The issue lay unresolved through the 1980s, but NAFTA negotiations pro-
vided an opportunity for Mexico to raise its concerns again. Avocados
dominated the agenda of many meetings of a joint Phytosanitary Working
Group, where scientists from USDA and Mexico’s Direccion General de
Sanidad Vegetal (DIGSV) sparred over data requirements, research de-
sign, and interpretation of research results concerning possible lifting of
the import ban. The technical debates centered on assessment of pest popu-
lations, the host status of Hass avocados for fruit flies, and the adequacy of
various proposed pest-risk mitigation strategies.
It took four years of bi-lateral procedural negotiations, data collec-
tion and analysis before USDA agreed to consider a Mexican plan for
easing the avocado quarantine under a systems approach to pest risk miti-
gation. With some further safeguards, a proposed rule was published by
USDA in July 1995 to allow imports of Mexican avocados grown and
processed under specified conditions. The proposed systems approach in-
cluded pre-harvest, harvest, packing, transport, and shipping, measures
designed to reduce pest risks. The distribution of imports was to be further
limited to the northeastern United States, to avoid geographic proximity
with regions susceptible to pest risks, and to four winter months when the
risk of establishment of pests was mitigated by adverse weather.2  USDA
concluded that its proposed approach would provide an adequate level of
security to domestic growers. Overall, USDA reported that with the pro-
posed systems approach in place, a seed pest or fruit fly outbreak was
estimated to occur on average less than once every 1,000,000 years and a
stem weevil outbreak might occur on average once every 11,402 years. A
recent USDA assessment of pest risk reductions from specific measures is
shown in Table 1.
____________________
2  The region referred to as the northeastern United States or northeast in this paper
includes two regions often separated in avocado shipment data: the northeast and east
central regions.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO CHANGE
With the geographic and seasonal restrictions in rule proposed by
USDA, partial easing of the ban opened less than five percent of the an-
nual U.S. market to Mexican avocados. Even this partial access was fought
aggressively by the domestic industry. The opposition was coordinated by
the California Avocado Commission (CAC), which had closely monitored
the deliberations from the outset of the NAFTA negotiations. The industry
made the argument that the avocado quarantine should not be sacrificed to
the political imperative of achieving a trade agreement. This was an ag-
gressive strategy by the industry that turned on its head the conventional
perception that regulatory processes are often under excessive pressure
not from foreign but from domestic interest groups. Numerous declara-
tions were made by the U.S. growers to the effect that “science might be
traded off in a rush to sign a trade deal.”3 The CAC argument was that
imports of Mexican avocados under the proposed systems approach posed
an unacceptable risk of pest infestation to domestic groves. The industry
asserted that the surveys of pest incidence had failed to establish low popu-
lation levels in the Michoacan growing area, that the proposed monitoring
protocols were inadequate, and that Hass avocados were a better host of
fruit flies than Mexico acknowledged.
Technical criticism of the pest surveys were detailed, including,
for example, objections to incorrect trap placement, weak trapping bait,
insufficient climatological records, and inadequate trapping densities.4 Any
infestations of domestic groves that resulted from importation of Mexican
avocados would be costly to contain due to U.S. pesticide regulations and
the close proximity of the domestic groves to residential neighborhoods.
Thus, the CAC recommended that Mexico should be allowed to export
avocados only under stringent conditions which included 1) that it could
establish pest-free zones, 2) that the imported avocados were treated with
a pesticide which assured at a very high probability level that exotic pests
____________________
3  Betsey Blanchard Chess, “Free Trade with Mexico”,  California Grower . June 1991,
p. 19.
4  Statement by the California Avocado Commission, Docket No. 94 -116-1. January 3,
1995.
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were eliminated, or 3) that additional scientific research unequivocally es-
tablished that Hass avocados were not hosts of pests which are injurious to
avocados and other fruits and vegetables grown in the United States.5
The conditions specified by the CAC for amendment of the avo-
cado quarantine could effectively have precluded importation of Hass avo-
cados from Mexico for the foreseeable future.  The first condition, estab-
lishing and maintaining a pest free zone, requires substantial eradication,
monitoring, and quarantine enforcement costs well beyond the perimeters
of commercial export groves in Mexico.  Although it might eventually
prove feasible technically, such an approach was regarded as uneconomi-
cal by Mexican officials who believed pest risks were already negligible.
On the second condition, all parties agreed that no adequate post-harvest
treatment was available.  The third condition, strictly interpreted, also could
not be met. The results of DIGSV’s fruit fly host status research had al-
ready indicated that fruit flies will attack Hass avocados shortly after they
have been harvested.  Additional research to rigorously establish the host
status of unharvested Hass avocados could only confirm that they are non-
preferred hosts, instead of the higher standard of “unequivocal non-host”
that the CAC recommended.
Industry opposition orchestrated by the CAC was effective in tem-
porarily blocking change to the quarantine when USDA announced it
would not make a decision on a final rule to allow avocado imports in time
for the 1995-96 winter shipping season. The CAC kept up its pressure in
1996. It threatened legal action to block lifting of the ban and attempted to
circumscribe USDA authority through an amendment to appropriations
legislation. Full-page advertisements were placed in several national news-
papers by the CAC. Against the backdrop of a hangman’s noose or smok-
ing gun, these ads claimed that “The USDA is about to sign the death
warrant for a billion dollar American industry.”6 The CAC also filed a new
petition with USDA in March 1996, asserting that pest surveys results for
1995-96 showed higher levels of host-specific and fruit fly infestations in
____________________
5  Statement by the CAC for Docket No. 94-116-1, ANPR  Concerning the  Importation
of Fresh Hass Avocado Fruit Grown in  Michoacan, Mexico. February, 1995, p. 2.
6  For example, The Washington Post. March 11, 1996, p. A16.63
Mexican orchards than had previously been reported, and that there had
been procedural irregularities in the rulemaking process that involved vio-
lation of federal conflict-of-interest law.7 The CAC petition argued that the
new pest survey results and procedure irregularities invalidated the
rulemaking process and requested another public comment period before
a final ruling was made to allow avocado imports from Mexico.
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
USDA’s regulatory procedures for SPS decisions require sequen-
tial analysis -- first determination that there is essentially no risk associated
with a proposed rule and second, on that basis, that economic impacts of
the rule be assessed. Such a sequential approach to decision making of this
type places greater emphasis on risk assessment than on comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis. When the mandate of regulatory authorities is stated
in such strong terms as protecting the domestic economy from negative
SPS externalities arising from trade, as it often is, then product bans and
other severe quarantine measures emerge quite naturally as policy out-
comes. A product ban is a high level of intervention to address an SPS
externality, but a ban does eliminate the externality risk to the extent that
trade is its proximate cause.
Even within the risk assessment dimension, there is plenty of room
for dispute. First, issues arise about whether an externality threat exists in a
given situation. Second, a ban may or may not be least trade distorting- -
perhaps there is another way to eliminate the externality risk, one that
allows the product to be traded under some specified conditions. Either
way, when the policy decision is perceived only in the risk assessment
dimension, there is no impetus to ask whether the cost of the policy is
warranted by the benefits, that is whether the level of intervention needed
to achieve the risk-reduction objective is also desirable on economic crite-
ria, such as maximizing the expected contribution of the affected markets
to national welfare.
____________________
7  “American Avocado Growers Uncover New Field Surveys on Mexican Avocado Pest
Infestations,” PR Newswire. March 28, 1996.




Figure 1: Free Trade.
Figure 2: Limited Trade -- Effects of Trade When Pest Infestations
Raise Domestic Production Costs.
In the avocado case, the contestation over the proposed rule brought
to light information about pest risks that provided the basis for a cost-
benefit analysis taking into account uncertainty about pest infestation (Orden
and Romano, 1996). The issues that arise in evaluating the economic ef-65
fects of either full or partial easing of an import ban are illustrated in Figure
1 and Figure 2, assuming a fixed world price for the product. The first
figure shows the effects of free trade when a pest infestation may raise
domestic costs. The domestic price PD1 falls to the world price PW, and
consumer surplus increases (by C+D+E) whether or not an infestation oc-
curs. Producer surplus falls by C+D (the trade effect) and additionally by
G (the infestation effect) if pests raises production costs and lower yields
with certainty, shifting domestic supply from S to S’. Consumers are al-
ways better off, producers are always worse off, and the net effect on
welfare (E- G) can be positive or negative. On a probabilistic basis, the
expected domestic supply function will lie between S and S’, with its
location depending on the assumed level of pest infestation risk.
The analysis is more complicated when only a limited quantity of
imports are allowed. Ignoring regional considerations, the limited imports
would lower the domestic price if there is no pest infestation, but to PD2 in
Figure 2 not to the world price level. The effects on consumers, producers
and net welfare are fractions of the outcomes with unrestricted free trade.
Pest infestation reduces domestic supply and affects the domestic price in
the opposite direction from imports. The equilibrium price can rise or fall.
When the domestic price rises, as shown from PD1 to PD3 in Figure 2,
consumers are worse off (by c+d). Producers surplus rises (by c) with the
higher prices but falls due to higher production costs (by f+i+k).  Produc-
ers may be better or worse off than at the initial equilibrium (better if
c>f+i+k). Producers may also be better or worse off than with trade but
without a pest infestation (better if c+e>i+k). Whatever the outcome for
producers, social welfare falls (by d+f+i+k) compared to its level at the
initial equilibrium, or (by d+f+i+k+g) compared to its level with trade but
without pest infestation.8
____________________
8  If  the net effect of trade and a pest infestation is for  the equilibrium  domestic  price
to fall (not shown),  consumers  are made  better  off and producers worse off than
without  trade  or pest  infestation,  consumers gain less, and producers  may  lose more
or  less than with trade but without pest infestation,  and net   welfare   may  rise  or  fall
(compared  to  the   initial equilibrium)  depending  on whether the net  consumer gain
from lower prices exceeds the infestation losses of producers.
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In their empirical analysis, Orden and Romano divided the domes-
tic U.S. avocado market into two submarkets- -the northeastern winter re-
gional market and the national aggregate for all other regions and seasons.
In the northeastern winter regional market, the domestic price was assumed
to fall to the price level of exports from Mexico, substantially below the
earlier domestic price. For the rest of the United States, an equilibrium
price was determined by domestic supply and aggregate demand with the
northeastern winter regional market excluded.9
The proposed partial easing of the avocado import ban had ex-
pected effects if no pest infestation occurred. In the northeastern re-
gion, the winter season price fell by 35 percent and consumption in-
creased. The domestic price for the remaining aggregated U.S. market
fell by 1.3 percent, as displacement effects from the northeastern win-
ter market were absorbed by a combination of expanded consumption
elsewhere and reduced domestic supply. A net national welfare gain of
$2.5 million resulted (about 2 percent of initial total consumer plus
producer surplus), mostly due to the lower price in the northeast. Con-
sumer surplus increased by $2.2 million outside of the northeast, but
producer surplus fell by a similar amount, so the net welfare gain was
small outside of the northeastern winter market. In contrast, a full lib-
eralization of trade (which was not under consideration by USDA) was
estimated to depress domestic avocado production by as much as 50
percent after full adjustment to lower prices, and to raise consumer
surplus by nearly $90 million nationwide.
Orden and Romano also considered the economic effects of the
proposed rule if a pest infestation occurred. A pest infestation increased
marginal costs and lowered yields, reducing domestic supply. In the
worst-case scenario, reduced availability of avocados under the partial
easing of the import ban pushed up the equilibrium domestic price
(excluding the northeastern winter regional market) by 30 percent. The
domestic price increase partly offset the effects on producers of lower
output and higher production costs but their net loss was $14.7 mil-
____________________
9 See Orden and Romano (1996), Roberts Josling and Orden (1999), and Orden, Narrod
and Glauber (2001) for more detailed descriptions of the analysis.67
lion, almost seven times as large as from partial easing of the ban alone.
A larger economic effect of the pest infestation was felt by consumers
outside of the northeastern winter market: their surplus fell by $43.5
million with the increased domestic price. Partial easing of the avo-
cado quarantine would not be sound phytosanitary or economic policy
under these circumstances. Yet on a probabilistic basis, it took a much
higher likelihood of pest infestation than reported by USDA to turn
expected net welfare effects negative. For full trade liberalization, even
under the worst-case pest infestation, there was a positive benefit-cost
relationship as consumer gains from lower prices more than offset the
domestic producer losses.
EASING OF THE BAN IN 1997
Despite continued industry opposition, in February 1997 USDA
issued a final rule permitting limited importation of avocados from
Mexico under the systems approach. In rejecting the industry argu-
ments about pest risk, the agriculture department reasserted its positive
assessment of the safety of the proposed approach and responded to
numerous comments received during the public comment period of
the rulemaking process. It also responded to the concerns raised in the
March 1996 CAC petition and subsequent CAC communication about
the pending decision. It found neither substantive nor procedural
grounds for further delay of a decision to allow limited imports under
the systems approach being adopted (USDA,1997). In its economic
assessment, USDA evaluated effects of the rule based on diversion of
from 10 to 50 percent of past Mexican exports during November-Feb-
ruary to the U.S. market. A diversion of 50 percent resulted in imports
near the level estimated by Orden and Romano. For this level of im-
ports, USDA found similar price effects in the Northeast region and the
rest of the country, but its estimates of producer surplus losses and
consumer surplus gains were larger. Once the final rule was published,
and imports scheduled to be allowed for the first time starting in No-
vember 1997, the domestic avocado industry did not file suit to block
the decision.
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Under the USDA ruling, Mexican avocados began to enter the
U.S. market during the winter of 1997-98. After four shipping seasons,
no pest infestations traceable to avocado imports had been detected,
lending credibility to the systems approach. Shipments of California
avocados to the northeast winter market were largely displaced by im-
ports from Mexico- -the California shipments fell to just 1.1 million
pounds during 1999-2000, from an average of 7.7 million pounds dur-
ing 1986-94 (USDA/APHIS, 2001). Wholesale prices of avocados im-
ported from Mexico have averaged about 25 percent less than whole-
sale prices of domestic avocados since 1997. This differential is con-
sistent with predictions of a regional price difference from the rest of
the U.S. market once imports from Mexico became available in the
northeast. Avocados from Mexico and California also appear to be im-
perfect substitutes in the northeast market, where a similar wholesale
price differential has persisted. Wholesale prices have remained above
import prices, which have averaged about $0.72 per pound. This is
consistent with historical import price-wholesale price differentials
observed for avocados from Chile in earlier years (USDA/ APHIS, 1997).
The limited opening of trade under the 1997 rule has provided
more export opportunity to Mexico than expected. Imports after the
first year have averaged over 23 million pounds from over 500 sepa-
rate shipments (21.5 million pounds in 560 shipments in 1998-99, 25.9
million pounds in 669 shipments in 1999-2000, and 22.5 million
pounds in 576 shipments in 2000-01). The level of imports from Mexico
has been well above the displaced California shipments and nearly
double the import demand of 13 million pounds in the Northeast win-
ter market predicted by Orden and Romano at the lower prices ex-
pected once imports from Mexico were allowed.
The extent to which Mexican imports have exceeded either dis-
placements of California sales or predictions from the economic model
suggest that one effect of easing of the quarantine has been expanded
consumer demand due to better seasonal availability of avocados. To
the extent that market expansion occurs, it provides benefits to con-
sumers and Mexican producers at little cost to domestic producers.69
Prior to 1997, Chile was the major producer of avocados during the
September-December period, and Chile still accounts for nearly five
times as much of the total U.S. supply as Mexico. Avocados from Mexico
compete with Chilean exports, but have not dampened total Chilean
market sales. The value of avocado imports from Chile has grown from
$16 million in 1997-98 to $51 million in 1998-99, $35 million in 1999-
2000, and $74 million in 2000-01. Simultaneous growth in imports
from Mexico and Chile has occurred in the context of a drop in U.S.
production, which fell by an average of 35 million pounds during the
three seasons 1997-98 to 1999-2000 compared to the average for the
two preceding seasons. This shows that imports can serve to stabilize
the market in the face of domestic supply variability, thus stabilizing
consumer product availability and prices, as well as offering a product
competitive with domestic production.
INCREASED ACCESS IN 2001
Based on early success of the avocado import program, in Sep-
tember 1999, Mexico requested that USDA expand its geographic and
seasonal access to the U.S. market. USDA acted within a year to obtain
public comments on this request and by November 2001, issued an
amended final rule. The revised rule added access for avocados from
Mexico to a west-central region and increased the shipping season to
six winter months. Adding the west-central region increased the do-
mestic shipments with which Mexican avocados would compete from
a past average of 7.7 million pounds over 1986-94 to 10.5 million
pounds. Increasing the length of the import season increased the do-
mestic shipments with which the Mexican avocados would compete
from 7.7 million pounds to 14.1 million pounds for the original access
area, and to 19.3 million pounds for the expanded area. Thus, the mar-
ket access is increased substantially for Mexico by the 2001 rule. Issu-
ance of the revised rule encountered less industry opposition than the
initial easing of the quarantine. But USDA had to overrule a late CAC
petition to suspend its decision process based on a court ruling against
the U.S. government on an earlier decision to permit citrus imports
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from Argentina, and the CAC filed a suit (still pending in March 2003)
to overturn the new USDA avocado rule.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The sequential issuance of the 1997 and 2001 USDA rules al-
lowing avocado imports from Mexico are an example of successful
adoption of a systems approach to risk mitigation that is less trade
distorting than a complete ban. The 2001 ruling more than doubled the
proportion of the total U.S. market to which Mexico has access, but
that proportion remains less than 10 percent. Some further progress
toward trade liberalization may be possible under the precedent set in
these two rules. USDA’s systems approach rests on numerous risk miti-
gation measures. Among these, the seasonal restriction “winter ship-
ping only” is estimated to reduce risk for just two types of pests and by
only 50-90 percent, which is relatively low compared to other mea-
sures (Table 1).
Completely relaxing the seasonal restrictions on shipments of
Mexican avocados to the northeast and west-central regions would again
more than double the proportion of the U.S. market to which Mexico
has access, and might be relatively easy to justify. Attaining access to
additional regions in the southeast, southwest and pacific could prove
more problematic. Limited U.S. distribution is credited with reducing
all pest risks by as much as 99 percent. Current access is subject to a
court challenge and unless a future case can be made that other mea-
sures provide sufficient pest risk protection without the geographic
restriction, the scope for Mexican access to the U.S. market may be
permanently constrained to those parts of the country where consump-
tion is relatively low. Thus, the avocado case also illustrates how diffi-
cult it is to make progress on trade expansion when there are complex
risk issues at stake and a strong domestic industry is affected by the
decision making outcome.71
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